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The role that time plays in Einstein’s theory of gravity and in quantum mechanics
is described, and the difficulties that these conflicting roles present for a quantum
theory of gravity are described.
I. GRAVITY AND TIME
The relation of any fundamental theory to time is crucial as was evident from the earliest
days of physics. If we go back to Newton’s Principia, in which he established a general
theoretical structure for the field of physics, we find an odd series of sentences in the first
few pages. He tells us that it is unnecessary to define time as it is obvious to all, but then
proceeds to do just that. And his definition is, certainly to modern eyes, rather strange. To
quote [1]
... I do not define time, space, place, and motion as being well known to all.
Only I observe, that the common people conceive these quantities under no other
notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise
certain prejudices, for the removing of which it will be convenient to distinguish
them into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and common.
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I. Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows
equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called
duration: relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external
(whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by means of motion, which
is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.
Reading this definition today, it is hard to see what the fuss is about. Time for us
common folk is exactly Newton’s true time. Taught about time since we were small, we
know that there is something, insensible but present in the universe, called time, something
that is separate from the other objects in the universe and the same everywhere. Newton
would certainly not need to include his definition today, nor would he ascribe to common
man that which he did.
It is precisely because we have so thoroughly absorbed Newton’s lesson that we all have
immense difficulty in coming to terms with the revolutions in physics of the twentieth century
and that we in physics now have such difficulty in producing a unified theory of quantum
mechanics and gravity.
It is the purpose of this paper to sketch the changes in the notion of time in twentieth
century physics. I will show how in General Relativity the nature of time changed radically
that of Newton and how gravity itself became an aspect of time. I will then examine the
role time plays in quantum physics. Finally, I will sketch ways in which the lack of a proper
understanding of time seems to be one of the chief impediments to developing a quantum
theory of gravity.
The change began with Special Relativity, the first theory in which time lost some part
of its absolute and invariant character. Time became, at least in some small sense, mutable.
It was precisely this conflict between a mutable notion of time and the absolute and unitary
notion of time inherited from Newton that has caused consternation and confusion. This
confusion came about not because of any innate violation of the sense of time that we are
born with. Time for children is flexible and changeable, and certainly need not be the same
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here as it is there. Throughout our early years we were taught the lessons of Newton. Time
was something out there, something that our watches measured, and something that really
was the same everywhere. We learnt while very young that our excuse to the teacher that
our time was different from the teacher’s time was not acceptable.
The conclusions of Special Relativity came into direct conflict with these early lessons.
The ‘Twins Paradox’ is the epitome of this confusion, because there is, of course, no paradox
at all except in the conflict between the notion of time as expressed in this theory and
the notion of time as expressed by Newton. It is because we have so thoroughly absorbed
Newton’s definition of time that we become confused when time in Special Relativity behaves
differently. In Special Relativity time, at least time as measured by any physical process,
became not the measure of that unitary non-physical phenomenon of universal time, but a
measure of distance within the new construct of ‘space-time’. No-one expresses any surprise,
or considers it a paradox, that the difference in the odometer readings on my car from the
start of a trip to its end is not the same as the difference on your odometer for our trips
from Vancouver to Toronto, especially if I went via Texas, while you went via the Trans
Canada Highway. Distances are simply not functions only of the end points of the journey
but depend on the complete history of the journey. Within Special Relativity the same is
true of time. Times are no longer dependent only on the beginning and end of our journey,
but are history-dependent and depend on the details of the journey themselves in exactly the
same way that distances do. Mathematically this is expressed by having the time in Special
Relativity be given by an extended notion of distance in an extended space called space–
time. Just as the spatial distance between two points depends on the details of the path
joining the to points, so the temporal distance joining two points at two separate instants
depends on the details of the path and the speed along that path joining the two points at
the two instants.
Even though time as a measure of the duration of a process became mutable, Special
Relativity was still a theory which retained some of the Newtonian picture. Just as space,
for Newton, was another of those non-material but real invariant externals, so in Special
3
Relativity space-time is also a real non-material invariant external. Instead of having two
such concepts, i.e., space and time, Special Relativity has them unified into one single
concept which retains most of the features of space.
This changed in General Relativity, Einstein’s theory of gravity. Within Special Rela-
tivity, the immutability, the sameness, the independence of space and time from the other
attributes of the universe, was kept inviolate. Although time, as measured by a watch, was
path-dependent, it was the same everywhere, and was independent of the nature of matter
around it. In General Relativity this aloofness vanished.
One often hears that what General Relativity did was to make time depend on gravity.
A gravitational field causes time to run differently from one place to the next, the so called
‘gravitational red shift’. We hear about experiments like the one done by Pound and Rebka
[2] in which the oscillation frequency of Iron Nuclei at the top and the bottom of the Harvard
tower were found to differ, or about Vessot’s [3] ‘disposal’ procedure of one of his Hydrogen
masers in which such a maser was shot up 10,000 km above the earth by rocket before
dropping into the Atlantic. During that journey, he noted that the maser ran more quickly
at the top of its trajectory than at the bottom, in agreement with General Relativity to
better than one part in five thousand. The lesson of these experiments would appear to be
that gravity alters the way clocks run. Such a dependence of time on gravity would have
been strange enough for the Newtonian view, but General Relativity is actually much more
radical than that. A more accurate way of summarizing the lessons of General Relativity is
that gravity does not cause time to run differently in different places (e.g., faster far from
the earth than near it). Gravity is the unequable flow of time from place to place. It is not
that there are two separate phenomena, namely gravity and time and that the one, gravity,
affects the other. Rather the theory states that the phenomena we usually ascribe to gravity
are actually caused by time’s flowing unequably from place to place.
This is strange. Most people find it very difficult even to imagine how such a statement
could be true. The two concepts, time and gravity, are so different that there would seem to
be no way that they could possibly have anything to do with each other, never mind being
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identical. That gravity could affect time, or rather could affect the rate at which clocks run,
is acceptable, but that gravity is in any sense the same as time seems naively unimaginable.
To give a hint about how General Relativity accomplishes this identification, I will use an
analogy. As with any analogy, there will be certain features that will carry the message that
I want to convey, and I will emphasize these. There are other features of the analogy which
may be misleading, and I will point out a few of these. The temptation with any analogy
is to try to extend it, to think about the subject (in this case time and gravity) by means
of the analogy and to ascribe to the theory (General Relativity) all aspects of the analogy,
when in fact only some of the aspects are valid.
In this analogy I will use the idea from Special Relativity that some of the aspects of time
are unified with those of space and that the true structure of space-time is in many ways the
same as our usual notions of space. I will therefore use a spatial analogy to examine certain
features of space-time in the vicinity of the earth. In order to be able to create a visual
model, I will neglect two of the ordinary dimensions of space and will be concerned only with
the physical spatial dimension of up and down along a single line through the center of the
earth chauvenistically chosen to go through my home city of Vancouver. In this model, time
will be represented by an additional spatial dimension, so that my full space–time model will
be given by a two dimensional spatial surface. What I will now argue is that I can explain
the most common manifestation of gravity that when I throw something up into the air,
it slows down and finally stops its ascent and then comes back down to the surface of the
earth (i.e., that which goes up must come down). Usually one ascribes this behaviour to the
presence of a force called gravity which acts on the object, pulling it down toward the center
of the earth. The crucial point is that one can alternatively explain this essential attribute
of gravity by assuming that time flows unequably from place to place, without calling into
play any ‘force of gravity’ at all.
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Figure 1
The lens shape used to create the model of the space-time near the earth
In order to develop the analogy, we must first interpret the phrase ‘time flows unequably’
in terms of our model. We can assume, for the purposes of our discussion, that the physical
phenomena near the earth are the same from one time to the next. I.e., if we are to
construct the two-dimensional space-time (up-down, and time) near the earth out of pieces
representing the space-time at different instants, those pieces should all look the same. I
will use pieces that look like lenses (see figure 1). The direction across the lens I will take
as time, and the direction along the lens I will take as space. These lenses have the feature
that the physically measurable time, which Special Relativity teaches is just the distance
across the lens, varies from place to place along the lens. I have thus interpreted the phrase
‘the flow of time is unequable’ as the statement that the distance (time) across each lens is
unequal from place to place. I will now glue a large number of these lenses together along
their long sides, giving us the two dimensional shape in figure 2, for which I will use the
technical term ‘beach ball’. I will take this beach ball to be a model of the space-time near
the earth, a space-time made out of pieces on which time flows unequably from place to
place.
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Figure 2
The spacetime made by gluing together the lenses
Let us now locate the surfaces of the earth in this model. The earth in the up–down
direction has two surfaces– one here in Vancouver and the other one near Isle Crozet in the
south Indian Ocean. Since the distance through the earth from Vancouver to this island
is constant, the distance between the two strips on the surface of the beach ball must be
constant from one time to the next to model this known fact about the earth accurately.
Furthermore, since we expect the system to be symmetric, we expect that ‘up’ here at
Vancouver, and ‘up’ at Isle Crozet should behave in exactly the same way. Thus, the
strips should be placed symmetrically on the beach ball. I thus have figure 3, with the two
black strips representing the two surfaces of the earth and the region between the strips
representing the interior of the earth.
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Figure 3
The two surfaces of the earth at Vancouver and at Isle Crozet drawn
in on the spacetime model. Between the two strips is the interior of the earth.
I stated that I would use this model to explain why, when something is thrown into the
air, it returns to the earth. To do so, we must first decide how bodies move when plotted
in this spacetime. I go back to the laws of motion first stated by Newton, in particular his
first law of motion.
Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line,
unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.
As I stated above, I will dispense with the idea of a gravitational force. I want to describe
gravity not as a force but as the unequable flow of time from place to place. A body thrown
up into the air is thus not acted upon by any forces. By the above law the body will continue
its motion in a ‘right’, or as we would now say, a straight line. But what does ‘straight’
mean in this context of plotting the path of the body on the surface of this beach ball? I go
back to one of the oldest definitions of a straight line, namely that a line is straight if it is
the shortest distance between any two points along the line.
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The beach ball is the surface of a sphere. On the surface of a sphere the shortest distance
between two points is given by a great circle. Thus, applying this generalization of Newton’s
Law, the free motion of a body on the two dimensional space-time modeled by the beach
ball will be some great circle around the ball. If we plot the vertical motion of an object
thrown into the air at Vancouver on this model of the space–time, that plot will have the
object following a great circle (straight line) on the surface of the beach ball. Consider the
great circle given in figure 4. Starting at point A, it describes the behaviour of a particle
leaving the surface of the earth. Initially, as time increases, the particle goes progressively
further from the surface of the earth. As gravity is not a force, the particle continues to
travel along the straight line (great circle). Eventually, the distance from the earth stops
increasing and begins to decrease. The straight line, the great circle, re-intersects the band
representing the surface of the earth at Vancouver at point B. I.e., the particle has returned
to the surface of the earth, just as a real body thrown away from the surface of the earth
will eventually return thereunto.
Figure 4
A great circle leaving the earths surface at A and returning at B.
Although one cannot construct as simple a model of the situation, one can show that
the same concept of the unequable flow of time can describe the behaviour of the moon
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as it orbits the earth. The moon also is following a straight line through the spacetime
surrounding the earth, a spacetime constructed so that the flow of time far from the earth
differs from its flow near the earth. The line is certainly not straight in space, but it is
straight if plotted in space–time, straight in the sense of always following a path which
either maximizes or minimizes the distance between any two points along the path.
With the above simple two-dimensional model one can also explain another aspect of
gravity, namely the pressure we feel on the soles of our feet as we stand. Usually we ascribe
this pressure to the response of the earth to the force of gravity pulling us down. As Einstein
already pointed out in 1908, there is another situation in which we feel the same pressure,
namely in an elevator accelerating upwards. In that case the pressure is not due to the
resistance of the floor of the elevator to some force pulling us down; rather, it is the force
exerted on us by the elevator in accelerating us upwards. Thus another possible explanation
for the force we feel under our feet is that the surface of the earth is accelerating upwards.
Of course the immediate reaction is that this seems silly— if the earth at Vancouver were
accelerating upwards and that at Isle Crozet were also accelerating upwards (since people
there also feel the same force on the soles of their feet when they stand), the earth must
surely be getting larger. The distance between two objects accelerating away from each
other must surely be changing. In the presence of an unequable flow of time this conclusion
does not necessarily follow, as I can again demonstrate with the beach ball. Both sides of the
earth can be accelerating upwards even though the distance between them does not change.
[4]
In our beach ball model, the diameter of the earth (the distance between the two black
lines) is clearly constant at all times. Let me carefully cut out one of the black strips, the
one representing the surface of the earth at Vancouver say, as in figure 5. I will lay the strip
out flat, as I have done with the peeled portion of the strip in figure 5. The resulting graph
is just the same as the graph of an accelerating object in flat space-time. Local (within the
vicinity of the strip) to the surface of the earth, the space-time is the same as that around an
accelerating particle, and one can therefore state that the surface of the earth at Vancouver
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is accelerating upwards. It is not following a straight line, It is following a curved line, and
by Newton’s first law must therefore have a force ( the one we feel on the soles of our feet)
which causes that acceleration. It is the acceleration upward of the surface of the earth
which leads to the sensation of a force on the soles of our feet.
Figure 5
Unwrapping the surface near Vancouver onto a flat surface.
I must at this point insert a few warnings. As I stated earlier, an analogy will often
contain features which are not applicable to the system being modeled. This holds true here
as well. In the lenses I used to make up the space–time near the earth, the time decreases
when we get further from the earth (i.e., the distance across the lens, and thus the time
as measured by a clock, is less far away than nearby). However, the Vessot experiment
showed that clocks far from the earth run faster not slower. Had we constructed our lenses
so as to have them wider far from the earth than near the earth objects would have been
repelled rather than being attracted to the surface of the earth as represented on the beach
ball. HOwever the beach ball analogy also assumes that the notion of distance in time is
identical to the notion of distance in space. In particular it assumes that distances in time
and space obey the usual Pythagorian formula, that the square of the distance along the
hypotenuse of a triangle is the sum of the squares along the other tow sides. However in
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General and Special Relativity space time is not strictly analogous to space. In particular,
the Pythagorian theorem for time contains a minus sign— the distance in space–time looks
like ∆x2 − ∆t2 — The distance along the hypotenuse equals the difference in the squares
of the other two sides, if one of the sides is in the time direction. These two effects, the
difference in sign and the difference in rate of flow between our model and in reality, cancel
so that both the analogy and reality have the feature that thrown objects return to the
earth.
Secondly, the feature that time reoccurs on the beach ball — i.e., by going forward in
time you get back to where you started— is not shared by the structure of time near the
earth. It is however interesting that once we have allowed time to become dynamic, once we
have allowed time to flow unequably, situations like space-times with closed time-like curves
(time travel) are at least a theoretical possibility. The past five years have seen an explosion
of interest in such situations in General Relativity [5].
The third feature of the model, that at a sufficient spatial distance from the earth the
flow of time goes to zero (the lens came to a point at the poles of the beach ball) is inaccurate
for the earth and is actually also unnecessary in the model. It would have been better to
use lenses whose sides became parallel far from the earth, with only a slight thickening near
and through the earth. Such a model would also have allowed a demonstration of escape
velocity. On the surface obtained by gluing a number of identical copies of this better lens
shape together, straight lines which have a sufficient slope at the earth’s surface do not
return, as they always do on the beach ball, but continue to spatial infinity. This added
realism would however have been at the expense of a greater difficulty in seeing what the
straight lines are in the model.
I have discussed the role of time in General Relativity at such length and in such an
elementary fashion, in order to emphasize the radical nature of change wrought by Einstein
in this theory, and to emphasize that the revolution in the nature of time is not simply some
abstruse and technical change, as is often claimed for General Relativity. Rather the change
is simple and fundamental. General Relativity is not simply another rather complicated
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field theory, but changes the very nature of physical explanation (what is gravity?) in a way
totally unexpected and still largely unappreciated by the general populace. We shall see
furthermore after the next section that this change of the role of time in General Relativity
has in fact led to a reintroduction of precisely the opposite of Newton’s definition of time,
namely the conception he ascribed to the common man (and which is today a conception
utterly foreign to the common man).
II. QUANTUM MECHANICS AND TIME
Time is also an important player in the theory of quantum mechanics, but it is in many
ways a very different player here than in General Relativity. It does not itself become a
participant in the action, but compensates for this by assuming a much more important role
in the interpretation of the theory.
I will identify and discuss, at varying lengths, four places in quantum mechanics where
time plays a crucial role. Two of these are in the area of what is usually called the dynamics
of the theory, and the other two are in the area of the interpretation of the theory.
I) A theory of physics operates by elevating certain features of the physical world to the
status of fundamental features. These features are modeled by certain mathematical struc-
tures, and the theory delivers its predictions and explanations in terms of those structures.
One of the key features in physics is that these fundamental structures are taken to be the
same at all times.
At each instant of time there is a set of fundamental dynamical variables, the fundamen-
tal quantities in terms of which the physical nature of the world is described. In quantum
mechanics these are represented mathematically as linear operators on some Hilbert space.
For example, if our world of discourse consists of some single particle, the fundamental vari-
ables are position and momentum. These are represented by Hermitian operators, and all
physical attributes are assumed to be represented by functions of these operators. Further-
more, as long as one’s world of discourse remains that single particle, these same variables
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will maintain their fundamental role. On the other hand, if our world of discourse is a
quantum field theory, (e.g., electromagnetism), these physical attributes will be the value of
the field at each spatial point, together with the conjugate momentum for that particular
field value.
It is one of the peculiar assumptions in physics that for any physical situation, the
fundamental set of physical attributes in terms of which we describe that situation are the
same at all times. The universe of discourse does not change from time to time. This is of
course very different from most other fields of human endeavour, in which any attempt to
pretend that the essential entities in terms of which the world is constructed are always the
same would be silly. Institutions fail and disappear, department heads retire. In physics,
on the other hand, one believes that the physical world can be described at all times by
the same physical structures, and that the changes in the world are simply the changing
relations between these fundamental entities or changes in the values of their properties.
One can regard this as either an admission by physicists that they will limit their interest
only to those situations in which such a universality and invariance of the fundamental
attributes is accurate or as the claim that all situations, no matter how complex and how
changeable, can be described by such a single unchanging set of fundamental attributes. The
almost universal belief among physicists is that the latter is the case, that at heart there are
some universal fundamental structures that can be used to describe any physical process in
the world.
Let me state this assumption in a slightly more technical vein. To do so I will review
the basic mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. I would refer the reader who is
not familiar with quantum mechanics to various books on the subject or to the article by
Shimony [6]. In quantum mechanics, the basic entities used to model the physical world are
linear operators on a Hilbert space. A Hilbert space is a collection of things, called vectors,
which you can add together to get another vector or which you can multiply by a complex
number to get another vector. I will denote these vectors by |name〉 where ‘name’ is simply
some symbol to name a particular vector. Thus linearity is expressed by the statement
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that if |a〉 and |b〉 are both vectors, then α|a〉 + β|b〉 is also a vector for arbitrary complex
numbers α and β. These vectors also have associated with them a concept of ‘inner product’,
designated by 〈a|b〉 which is a complex number associated with any two vectors |a〉 and |b〉.
It is chosen such that 〈a|a〉 is always real, 〈a|b+ c〉 = 〈a|b〉+ 〈a|c〉, and 〈αa|αa〉 = |α|2〈a|a〉
for any complex number α. (Note that the vector |αa〉 is used to designate the vector α|a〉
and |b+ c〉 designates the vector |b〉+ |c〉. The real number 〈a|a〉 denotes the length squared
of the vector |a〉.)
These vectors in the Hilbert space do not have any direct physical meaning, but they do
form an important element in the interpretation of the theory and in the establishment of
the relation between the theory and particular realizations of the theory in the real world.
The fundamental attributes of the physical world are the linear operators on this Hilbert
space. An operator is any function, which takes as input a vector in the Hilbert space, and
gives as output a possibly different vector in the same Hilbert space. If we designate an
operator by the capital letter A, the we designate the result of the operation by A(|b〉) or
often by A|b〉. These operators are linear if the result of the operation of the operator on the
vector which is the sum of two input vectors gives as its output a vector which is the sum of
the two individual outputs, i.e., if A(|b〉+ |c〉) = A(|b〉)+A(|b〉). In the theory there are two
types of operators which are of special interest– Unitary and Hermitian operators. Unitary
operators are operators which do not change the length of a vector. I.e.,, if the length of
the vector U |a〉 is the same as the length of |a〉 for all vectors |a〉, then the operator U is
unitary. Hermitian operators are those for which their ‘expectation values’ are real. The
expectation value of an operator H in a state |a〉 is the inner product between the state |a〉
and the transformed vector H(|a〉). In quantum theory all potential physical attributes of
the world are modeled by Hermitian operators.
It would be at least conceptually possible that the Hilbert space, and thus the operators
that act on the Hilbert space, could change from time to time. One could imagine that
certain things which were possible, which were measurable, at least in principle, at one
time, did not even exist at some other time, that the set of all physical quantities could be
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different at one time from the next. However this is not the case in quantum mechanics. The
physical variables, the set of operators and the Hilbert space on which those operators act,
are assumed to be the same at all times. As with classical physics, the change in the world
that we want to describe or explain lies not in a change to the fundamental structures of
the world, but in a change to the relation of these structures to each other or in the ‘values’
that these operators have.
This first role of time might appear trivial. Time plays a role in designating the set of
fundamental attributes in terms of which we describe the world. Of course the physicist can
decide to focus on some smaller set of fundamental attributes of the world that is of interest
at any given time. But these changing simpler structures are not produced by some aspect
of time, they are produced by the changing focus of the physicist. The belief is strongly
held that at heart there exists some one set of universal operators, some one global Hilbert
space, which can be used (barring technical difficulties) to describe everything in the world
throughout all time.
New theories may demand new assumptions. The possibility exists that the world could
change from time to time in some fundamental way, not just in detail. I will argue below
that such genuine novelty may be needed in order to describe the quantum evolution of the
universe.
II) Having defined the mathematical structures used by the theory to describe the world,
one must then try to use them to explain the world. In particular, one wishes to use
the theory to explain the change we see about us. Since the mathematical structure is
explained are constant, the explanation for change must be in terms of changing relations
amongst the fundamental entities and changes in the the relation between the mathematical
structures and the physical world. This explanation is done via the equations of motion,
equations relating the entities describing the world at one time to those describing the world
at another time.
I will work in what is termed the Heisenberg representation in which the identification
of the operators on the Hilbert space with some physical attribute changes from time to
16
time. There is an equivalent representation, the Schroedinger representation, in which the
Hilbert space vectors transform over time but the identification of certain operators with
physical entities remains constant. The two are equivalent in their ultimate predictions, but
for various reasons, I favour the former. I feel that it makes the distinction between the
formal, dynamical aspects of the theory and the interpretative aspects clearer.
Which operator on the Hilbert space corresponds to which physical attribute of the
world? This identification can change from time to time. These changes form the essence of
the dynamics of the theory, and are expressed in quantum mechanics by a set of equations
of motion which take the form of the Heisenberg equations of evolution
ih¯
dA
dt
= [A,H ] ≡ AH −HA
A is any dynamical operator representing some aspect of the physical world, and H is a special
operator in the theory, the Hamiltonian, usually identified with the energy of the system.
It is by means of these dynamical equations of the theory, these changes in identification
from time to time of the operators with the physical reality, that one hopes to encode the
dual characteristics of the world as envisioned by physicists. That dual character is one of
a fundamental identity from one instant of time to the next (at all times one can describe
the world by the same set of operators), together with the possibility and reality of change
and transmutation, which is so much a part of the world around us.
III) Quantum mechanics arose out of, and encodes within its interpretation, a very un-
comfortable feature of the world, that the world seems to operate on the basis of insufficient
cause. Things just happen, without our being able to ascribe any sufficient cause to explain
the details of what occurred. Given two absolutely identical situations (causes), the out-
comes (effects) can differ. This feature caused Einstein so much intellectual pain that he
rejected the theory, even though he had been a key player in its foundation. It is still one of
the most disconcerting aspects of the theory and the world. It seems to call into question
the very purpose of physics, and it lies at the heart of the disquiet felt by even some of the
best physicists [7]. However, all the evidence indicates that nature operates in accordance
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with quantum mechanics. One’s first reaction would be to say that somehow at heart the
universe surely operates with sufficient cause— that when we say that identical situations
produce differing results, it is really that the situations were not identical, but that there
were overlooked features of the world which caused the differing outcomes. However, the
evidence is that this is not how the world operates, that God truly does “play dice” [8].
How is this element of insufficient cause encoded in the quantum theory, and how does
time, the subject of this paper, enter into this encoding? As mentioned above, each physical
attribute of the world is represented by an operator on the Hilbert space. But physical
attributes are not seen by us to be operators, rather they are seen to have definite values
and definite relations to each other. The position of my car is not some operator which
moves abstract vectors around but is some number, say twenty feet in front of my house.
How can I relate the operator which represents the position of my car in the theory, with
this number which represents the position of my car in the world?
The answer is that Hermitian operators have the property that there are certain vectors
(called eigenvectors) in the Hilbert space for which the operation of the operator is simply
multiplication by some constant (called the eigenvalue). Quantum mechanics states that
the set of numbers, the set of all of the possible eigenvalues of the operator, is also the set
of possible values that the physical attribute corresponding to the operator can have. If my
car can have any one of the real numbers as a possible value for the position of my car, the
operator representing the position of my car must have an eigenvalue corresponding to each
of those real numbers. The vectors of the Hilbert space are now used in the following way.
If one of the vectors in the Hilbert space represents the actual state of the world, then the
theory tells us what the probability is that, given the state of the world, the value of the
physical attribute corresponding to that operator takes some given value. I.e., the theory
does not tell us what the value of the attribute is, it tells us what the probability is that it
has some value.
How do those values correspond to out experience of the physical world and our ex-
perience with those attributes that the system has? In clasical physics any attribute of a
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physical system is taken to have some unique value at all times. In quantum theory the
situation is more difficult. It seems to be impossible to hold to the classical notion of each
attribute having a value at all times. However there are certain situations, called measure-
ment situations in which the attribute is taken to have some value, because it has been
measred to have a value. Each operator representing a physical value has in general many
eigenvalues, and thus the attribute has many potential values. The assumption is that at
any given time, if a “measurement” is made of the attribute, one and only one of these
potential values can be realised. The theory does not specify which value will be realised,
but rather gives probabilities for the various possibilities. Furthermore, these probabilities
are such that the probability of obtaining two (or more) distinct values is zero, and the
probability of obtaining any one of the complete set of values is unity. From the definition
of probabilities, if a and a′ are two separate possible values for an operator A, then the
impossibility of having two separate values gives Prob(a and a′) = 0. This then leads to
Prob(a or a′) = Prob(a) + Prob(a′). Furthermore, if we ask for the probability that one of
the eigenvalues is realized, we have
Prob(a or a′ or ... or a′′′′′) = Prob(a) + Prob(a′) + ...+ Prob(a′′′′′) = 1
where the set is the whole set of all possible eigenvalues of A.
Again this feature seems obvious, but time enters into this statement in a crucial way.
The statement that one and only one value is obtained is true only at some given specific
time. It is simply not true without the temporal condition ‘at one time’. If we do not specify
time, my car can have many different positions (and it did today). It is only at a single time
that we can state that the car had one and only one position.
This seemingly trivial fact is encoded into quantum theory at the most fundamental
level. The probability of an eigenvalue is given by the square of the dot (or more usually
called the inner) product between the two vectors, or in symbolic terms, the probability that
the operator A has value a is given by the square of the dot product between the eigenvector
|a〉 associated with the eigenvalue a, and the state vector of the system, written |ψ〉, so that
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Prob(a) = | < a|ψ > |2
. The statement that only one value can be realized leads to
Prob(aora′) = |〈a|ψ〉|2 + |〈a′|ψ〉2
and that at least one value must be realized gives
Prob(a or a′ or ... or a′′′′′) = |〈a|ψ〉|+ |〈a′|ψ〉|2 + ...+ |〈a′′′′′|ψ〉|2 = 1.
It is because of this physical demand that we can use the eigenvectors of Hermitian opera-
tors as the models for physical attributes— The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Hermitian
operators have exactly this required structure.
The third role that time plays in the theory, then, is that, given some physical attribute,
that attribute can take one of a whole range of values, but at any single instant in time it
can take at most one of those values (the values are statistically independent), and it must
take at least one of those values (the values are complete).
As with the first property of time, this property seems almost to be trivial. It is at least
very difficult to see how it could be changed without completely altering the structure of
quantum mechanics. Furthermore it would seem to reflect a fundamental attribute of the
real world. However, as I will argue that quantum gravity may require such a change.
IV) The fourth role that time plays is in setting the contingencies or conditions for
the predictions of the theory. Theories in physics are designed to be broad. They are,
especially if they are to be fundamental theories, designed to be applicable in any and all
conceivable situations. They are generic and not specific, universal and not particular. But
any experiment, any experience of the world is specific and particular. How can the theory
be applied to these specific cases?
In classical physics, the answer lies in the ‘initial’ conditions. Although the theory itself
is universal and generic, the specific contingencies of any particular situation can be encoded
so as to make the predictions of the theory specific and particular. The theory itself identifies
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the dynamical variables in terms of which one will describe any situation. The equations of
motion specify how the values of these variables at any one time are related to those at any
other time. To complete the picture, therefore, one must specify the variables at some one
time. Given the values of all of the variables at one time, the values at any other time are
completely determined by the theory through the equations of motion. This specification of
the values of all of the variables is given the name in classical physics of ‘initial conditions’.
Although the term ‘initial’ is used, there is no need that the values be specified at a time
earlier than the time of interest, or even that the variables all be specified at one time.
For example, instead of specifying the values of the position and momentum of a particle
at one time, one can specify the position at two separate times. Both have the effect of
completely particularizing the theory. Having specified these initial conditions, the theory
provides a complete model for the world in some particular situation and for all times. Any
new information gleaned about the system, which takes the form of finding new values for
some variables at different times, must either agree in particular with the values predicted
by the theory, or the theory must be thrown out as a model for the physical situation. This
is the situations which led to Laplace’s famous statement
... An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as
well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, would be able to
comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well as the
lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful
to subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as
well as the past would be present to its eyes. [9]
This is not true for quantum mechanics, although three hundred years of classical physics
still exerts its views on quantum theory, and quantum mechanics is often treated as though
it were cast in the same mold.
As mentioned, quantum mechanics is a theory of insufficient cause. The complete specifi-
cation of the theory at one instant of time is not sufficient to completely specify the outcomes
21
of any experiment at all other times. Some things will ‘just happen’. As a result the effect of
the setting of the conditions on the predictions of the theory are much more subtle, complex
and profound than they are in classical physics.
Let us begin with the simplest text book case. Let us say that at some time t0, we know
[10] that the dynamic variable A has the value a. As I stated, the value a must be one of
the eigenvalues of A and has associated a vector in the Hilbert space called the eigenvector,
which I will write |a >. Since we know the physical variable A to have value a, we need
that the probability that it has value a be unity, and the probability that it have value a′
different from a be zero (it can by property III have only one value at a given time.) As
stated previously, the probability of having a value a′ for some vector in the Hilbert space
|ψ〉 is given by the square of the dot product between the eigenvector |a′〉 and the state
vector |ψ〉. It is one of the fortunate features of Hermitian operators, that 〈a′|a〉 = 0 for
eigenvectors associated with different eigenvalues of the same operator. If we choose the
state vector to be |ψ〉 = |a〉, we will precisely encode the belief that we know the value of
property A to be a. The state vector for the system is thus the way we have of encoding the
conditions under which we want the theory to deliver answers to us. In particular we choose
the state vector to encode the information that we know that some physical property has
some definite value.
Now, for any other operator B, at a later time say, we can calculate the probability that
the physical variable represented by B has value b by the square of the dot product |〈b|a〉|2.
Note that this does not in general lead to the statement that the system has some value b at
that later time, as it would in classical physics. It leads to the statement that there is some
probability that it has the value b. However, what value it will actually be found to have
if it were measured is unknown. It could have any of the allowed values (i.e., those with
non-zero probability). The actual value ‘just happens’, and the theory can give no further
cause as to why that, and not one of the other possible values, obtained.
This procedure has much of the flavour of classical physics. Knowing that A has value
a allows us to assign as an ‘initial conditions’ the ‘value’ |a > to the wave function of the
22
system. Future predictions now use this ‘value’ of the state vector. That the ‘value’ is
actually a vector in the Hilbert space rather than the assignment of the value a to some
specific variable could be seen as a difference in detail rather than essence. The theory
differs from classical physics, but it would seem in this description to fall into the same
‘initial condition— equation of motion’ framework as classical physics. This is especially
true if one works in the Schroedinger, rather than the Heisenberg representation of quantum
mechanics where the dynamical evolution is encoded in a time variation of the state vector
or the theory rather than in a changing identification of operators with physical attribute.
The Schroedinger equation looks like
ih¯
d|ψ〉
dt
= H|ψ〉,
and the specification of the condition now looks like a specification of the initial conditions
for |ψ >. This fact together with the three hundred year involvement with classical physics
has helped to confuse students into thinking that quantum physics really is little different
from classical physics.
The differences between the two are not simply matters of detail, however, but are really
a matter of essence. This becomes clear if we now ask a further question. In addition to
knowing that the value of A at time t0 is a, I now also know that at the time t1 the value
of B is b. How do I encode this additional information into the theory? In classical physics
you don’t. The additional information is either redundant (in that it does not alter the
predictions which could have been made using a alone), or it is inconsistent, in which case
the theory must be scrapped. (I am assuming that the knowledge of a was complete, in that
it specified the value of all dynamic variables in the classical theory. If not, the additional
knowledge of b could further refine one’s knowledge of the ‘initial conditions’. The knowledge
of b could not make something that was impossible knowing a alone into something possible
with the extra knowledge.)
In quantum mechanics the situation is very different. The knowledge of a predicted only
a probability for the various values that B could have. The additional information that
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B had value b is therefore certainly not redundant- the knowledge of the actual value is
obviously a much stronger piece of information than merely a list of probabilities. It is also
in general not inconsistent– anything with a non-zero probability could after all occur. Since
the knowledge of b and a is stronger than the knowledge of a alone, how is this new stronger
piece of information incorporated into the theory for the prediction of the values of some
other variable C say? The elementary answer is that if B is later than A, then B supersedes
A. I.e., for all measurements made after that of B, one uses the wave function |b〉 as |ψ〉
rather than |a〉.
The process of replacing the knowledge of A by the knowledge of B is traditionally called
the “collapse of the wave packet”. It has caused much confusion in the literature. In the
Schroedinger representation, in which the wave function changes both due to the dynamic
evolution and due to such ‘collapses’, this change in the state due to a change in knowledge
has called forth much, in my opinion, misplaced speculation about the dynamics of such a
‘collapse’. The collapse is not dynamics. It is the incorporation into a theory of insufficient
cause of new information, of new conditions, not contained in the old information.
This rule, that later knowledge supersedes earlier, has also led to comments that quantum
mechanics is, in some sense, inherently time asymmetric. After all, the latter supersedes the
former, not the other way around. However, the appearance of time asymmetry is due to
the fact that the question being asked is inherently time asymmetric. The latter replaces
the former if one is asking questions about the system at a even later time. The latter does
not supersede the former in other cases. To highlight this point let us ask a different type of
question. Given that I know that A has value a at time t0, and that B had value b at a later
time t1, what are the probabilities that C had value c at an intermediate time t2 between t0
and t1?.
As specific examples are often more comprehensible than general arguments, I will present
a specific example, but the conclusions drawn will have general applicability. As always in
the field of interpretation, one tries to work with as simple a system as possible so as
not to obscure the essential point with a forest of technical detail. I will therefore take the
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ubiquitous spin 1
2
system, with the most trivial of Hamiltonians, namely zero. The dynamics
are therefore trivial in that nothing ever changes— the operators at different times are related
to each other by being the same at all times. The dynamical equations of motion are
dA
dt
= 0
A spin 1
2
quantum system has the peculiar property that the value of the spin in any direction
can only take one of two values, namely ±1
2
. We are going to assume that at some time,
say one of 9AM, 10AM and 11AM, we know that the physical system has a value for the
x component of the spin of +1
2
, Similarly at another one of those three times, we know
that the system has a value of +1
2
for the y component. The question we ask is “What is
the value of the component of the spin along an axis between the x and y axes making an
angle of θ to the x axis at the third time?” In classical physics, the answer is simple and
straightforward. Because the dynamics is trivial, we then know that the x and y components
of the spin are independent, and both had value 1
2
at all times. Furthermore since spin is a
vector, the midway component, let me call it Sθ, will just be an appropriate sum of the two
known vector components, and must have a value of
√
2
2
cos(θ − 45o). Having specified the
values of Sx and Sy the values of all intermediate components are specified uniquely at all
times.
In quantum mechanics on the other hand, the situation is more complicated. There are
in principle six different answers, depending on the times at which the system was assumed
to have had those values in relation to the time about which we are asking the question. Let
me write SaSbSc to designate that the condition of Sa having some value is for 9AM, Sb for
10AM and Sc at 11AM. The various possibilities for the temporal order of the conditions
are the six permutations
a)SxSySθ b)SySxSθ c)SxSθSy
d)SySθSx e)SθSxSy f)SθSySx
I will concentrate on the first four of these. Although one can say something also about
the last two cases, the potential controversy would hide the point I am trying to make. In
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the first two cases, the answers quantum mechanically are different, while classically they
must be the same. In the first the value of Sy supersedes that of Sx in determining the
probabilities for the two possible outcomes of Sθ. In the second the value of Sx supersedes
that of Sy. In each case 9AM condition is irrelevant, because the 10AM condition completely
supersedes it. One says that the state of the system is the state determined by the 10AM
condition, i.e., is the +1
2
eigenstate of Sy and Sx respectively, and the prediction for the
probability that Sθ has value
1
2
at 11AM is 1
2
(1+ sin(θ)) in case a, and 1
2
(1 + cos(θ)) in case
b. Note that these are not the same as each other.
The cases c and d both also have unambiguous answers in quantum mechanics, and both
are identical. The probability that Sθ will have value
1
2
is
Pθ =
1 + cos(θ) + sin(θ) + cos(θ) sin(θ)
2(1 + cos(θ) sin(θ))
This probability function has at least one peculiar property. We see that the probability
of measuring Sθ to have value
1
2
is unity (certainty) both when θ has the value zero and when
θ has the value 90o. I.e., the probability that one will measure Sx ≡ S0 at the intermediate
time to have value 1
2
is unity and the probability to measure Sy ≡ S90 to have value 12 is also
unity. It is however easy to prove that there exists no state vector whatsoever in the Hilbert
space of this spin 1
2
particle which could give this result. I.e., there exists no |ψ〉 such that
|〈+1
2
, x|ψ〉|2 = |〈+1
2
, y|ψ〉|2 = 1.
We learn from this example that the temporal ordering of the conditions that one places
on the question that one asks of the theory are crucial to obtaining answers from the theory.
Unlike classical mechanics, the conditions cannot in general be mapped back onto initial
conditions. Time, and in particular temporal ordering, is needed in a crucial way not just
to set up the dynamical relations, but also to extract sensible predictions from the theory.
Another lesson we can learn from this example is that quantum mechanics does not have
a inherent time order to it. If it had, one would have expected the answers to conditions c
and d to differ. After all the temporal order is completely reversed in the latter with respect
to the former. However the predictions are identical. The fact that a and c differ, even
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though just the temporal order of Sy and Sθ have changed is no surprise since the condition
on Sx at 9AM in both cases ensures that these are not the time reverse of each other.
This is of possible relevance to the discussion that Roger Penrose gives in his book, “The
Emperor’s New Mind”. He argues that quantum mechanics itself implicitly contains a time
ordering, that the specification of the conditions leads to a clear and natural time ordering.
The relevant section occurs on page 357, where he describes an experiment in which a lamp
is placed in front of a half silvered mirror. One now places a “photon” detector just in front
of the mirror, to detect when the lamp sends a photon toward the mirror, and a detector
behind the mirror. One finds that although the probability is only 1
2
that the second one
will have detected a photon when the first one does, the probability is unity that the first
one will have when the second one is found to have detected one. He then adduces this as
an argument in favour of the position that quantum measurement contains within itself an
arrow of time (as well as a time ordering.) I.e., the placing the condition on the photon
exiting and asking for the probability that the photon entered is not the same as placing
the condition on the photon entering and asking the probability that it exited.
B
C
D
A
Lamp
Half Silvered
Mirror
Figure 6
Arrangement of the detectors and the half silvered mirror.
Let me rephrase the problem posed by Penrose in a slightly different way. Consider
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a half silvered mirror, with non-destructive photon detectors placed at its inputs A, B,
C, D (see figure 6). Each detector detects the presence of a photon but lets it pass by
unimpeded. Suppose we come across the notebook of an experimentalist in which she has
carefully recorded the readings at all the ports. As expected, anytime either A or B gave a
reading, so did C or D. Furthermore, A and B never gave reading together, nor did C and
D. Beyond these facts however, the readings turn out to be slightly peculiar. The notebook
never reported B as giving a reading. It seems that each photon always passed through port
A. The results for the C and D ports were however roughly equally split, in that 50% went
through C and 50% through D. The experimentalist furthermore stated on the page that
all four detectors were working and that all readings in which at least one detector fired
were recorded. Do these results imply a time ordering in and of themselves.? Does this time
ordering imply that the time ordering is an inherent part of quantum mechanics? The naive
answer is that the photons must have come in through port A and exited through either
of ports C and D. We know that there is no quantum state which would allow a photon to
come in through port C and exit, with unit probability, through port A, while states exist
for which the photon could enter port A and exit with 50-50 probability through port C or
D. Does this imply a time-asymmetry in quantum mechanics as Penrose implies?
The problem is that there is something to be explained in either direction of time. Ports
A and B are completely symmetric. Why is there then an asymmetry in the readings at the
two ports, i.e., port A is the only one with any detections. The answer that Penrose would
give when we interpret A as the input port is that there is a light bulb at A and not one at
B. The light bulb conditions the initial state of the electromagnetic field (i.e., we know that
there are photons in the initial state caused by the light bulb). However the measurement
at A coming later than the conditioning by the light bulb supersedes the effect of the light
bulb, if we are interested in the outcomes at ports C and D. All we need to calculate the
measurements at C and D is this knowledge that the photons came through A. If we now
regard the system in the time reverse sense, where A is an output port, there is again
something to be explained, namely why did all of the photons exit through A. The photons
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come in at C or D with equal probability (which we would have expected a priori). However
none exited at B. We cannot explain this from any initial conditions, because the knowledge
that the photon came in through C or D will supersede any other initial knowledge. We can
however explain it through a final condition, a condition which for some reason or another
disallowed any recorded photons at B. Because we are now specifying both initial (photon
through either C or D) and final conditions, there will be no wave function which encodes
these conditions. However quantum mechanics can still make well defined predictions even
in such an intermediate time case.
Now, one might ask how one could arrange these final conditions in any natural way.
After all we all know how to set up the time reversed situation easily— light sources are
easily built to send photons into port A rather than port B. The reverse in which something
disallows photons from exiting from B is not easily arranged. However this takes us into the
whole realm of the usual statistical arrow of time. Certain conditions are easy to arrange,
and certain condition are very difficult to arrange in the world we live in. Cups of tea cool
not heat up when placed in a room-temperature environment. The difficulty in arranging
the latter is not generally accepted as a proof that the fundamental laws of physics are time
asymmetric. Similarly, the difficulty of arranging an anti-light sink at B does not imply that
there is anything fundamentally time asymmetric about quantum mechanics.
The fact that quantum mechanics itself does not pick out a direction in time was rec-
ognized already over 20 years ago by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [11]. They also
suggested the formalism for handling cases in which the conditions do not necessarily precede
the times at which the predictions are to be made. That formalism has been independently
rediscovered a number of times since by others(including me), which illustrates the lack of
impact that this fundamental insight has had at least on the teaching of the subject. It
also illustrates the fact that the very different role played by the conditions in quantum
mechanics from that in classical mechanics has still not been instilled into the thoughts of
most of the practitioners of the subject. In Appendix A I have outlined this formalism. For
a more detailed exposition I would refer the reader to the literature.
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Aharonov and collaborators have recently been emphasizing the peculiarities of situations
in which one sets conditions both before and after the time at which one wishes to discuss
the possible outcomes of experiments. Because of the paradoxical nature of some of these
results, I will present one of their examples here [12]. This is done to further reinforce the
point I am making about the different behaviour of the conditions in quantum mechanics
from the behaviour of initial conditions in classical mechanics and in addition illustrates the
point that the subject of knowledge and the relation of knowledge to physical measurements
can be subtle in quantum mechanics.
The spin of a system in quantum mechanics is a vector ~S, and represents an internal
type of angular momentum for the system. Angular momentum in quantum mechanics has
a number of strange properties, one of which is that the angular momentum cannot take
on any arbitrary value. The eigenvalues for the operator corresponding to the total spin,
namely ~S · ~S, take on only a range of values of the form s(s+1), where s is an integer divided
by two. I.e. the allowed values are discrete. Furthermore, if the total spin is s (which is
the conventional shorthand for saying that ~S · ~S has value s(s+1)), then any component of
the spin can only have values lying between −s and s and the value must differ from s by
a whole number. Consider some spin s system At time t = 0, we measure the value of the
spin in the x direction (i.e., the x component of the spin), and find it to have value s (i.e.,
the maximum amount). At time t1 we measure the spin in the direction lying in the x− z
plane half way between the x and z axes. (i.e., we measure the operator S45 =
1√
2
(Sx+Sz)).
This measurement we carry out inexactly, to an accuracy of only of order ±√s. Finally
at time t2 we measure the spin in the z direction, and again find it to be s. What is
the probability distribution for the outcomes of the intermediate measurement of S45? The
answer turns out to depend on exactly what one means by ‘measure inexactly’, but there is a
perfectly well defined and acceptable meaning in which the answer is that the measurement
of S45 gives a value of
√
2s, ie, about 40% larger than the maximum eigenvalue that S45
has. Such an answer is obviously silly if at the intermediate time we could imagine the spin
system to have some wave function which describes its state, since the mean value of the
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probability distribution over the eigenvalues must be smaller than the largest possible value.
This strange, but true result arises from a conspiracy between the fact that we are asking an
intermediate time question (i.e., our conditions are not purely initial or final conditions, but
rather are mixed conditions), and the fact that the intermediate measurement is inexact.
Note that if the inexactness of the measurement is of order
√
s, then for a sufficiently large
s, .4s >>
√
s, i.e. the error is much smaller than the deviation from the maximum value.
Let me put a bit more flesh onto the above bones. The initial and final measurements
are assumed to be perfect exact measurements. For the intermediate measurement we will
institute the requirement that the measurement be inexact by coupling the spin system to
another system which will be our measuring apparatus. The measuring apparatus will be
assumed to be a free particle of infinite mass and zero potential energy- i.e. I will assume
that the free Hamiltonian of the particle is zero. (This is supposed to represent say the
dynamics of a massive apparatus pointer.) The coupling will be taken to be such that the
interaction between the apparatus and the spin system is instantaneous (i.e., a delta function
in time) and is proportional to the momentum of the particle times the spin. I.e. the full
Hamiltonian for the system is
H = S45pδ(t− t1)
In the Heisenberg representation, we find that the dynamics of the apparatus is given by
p(t) = p(0)
q(t) = q(0) + S45
S45(t) = S45(0)
S−45(t) = cos(p)S−45(0) + sin(p)Sy(0)
The inaccuracy of the measuring apparatus will be introduced by assuming that it is the
value of q which will be used to infer the measured value of S45. I.e., we will measure q
exactly after the coupling between the particle and the spin has completed and use that
value to infer the value of the 45o component. To obtain the value of this component we
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must subtract the final value of q from the initial value of q since the coupling to the spin
causes the value of q to change. To mimic the inaccurate measurement, I will assume that
the initial value of q is not exactly known, that the initial state of the apparatus is such
that the initial q has a spread in possible values over a range ∆q = σ ≈ √s. I will take the
initial wave function for q to be a Gaussian, centered at 0 with standard deviation of σ.
Ψ(q) =
1√
πσ
e(
q
σ)
2
. This measuring apparatus does behave like a proper apparatus should. If we assume that
the state of the spin system is in fact an eigenstate of S45, the final probability distribution
of q values is just a Gaussian, centered around that eigenvalue of S45, with width σ. I.e., the
best estimate for the value of S45 will just be the value measured for q with an uncertainty
in the inferred value of ±σ. I have carried out the calculation for the situation presented
in our problem above, namely that Sx had value s before the measurement and Sz had
value s afterwards for a value of s = 20, and for various values of σ. These results are
presented in figures 7-10. In figure 7, I have taken σ = .5. The intermediate apparatus is
sufficiently accurate to distinguish between the various possible values of the spin component
(which we recall must be separated by unity from each other.) The result is as expected,
a series of Gaussian peaks centered on the expected possible values for the total spin, with
various heights representing the differing probabilities that the spin has those different values.
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Figure 7
The Probability distribution for the pointer measuring the spin with uncertainty .5— Maximum spin=20
In figure 8, I have increased σ to 1, and the measurement is not as accurate. There are
still a series of peaks, but these are no longer centered on the values we would have expected
for the spin, i.e. they are no longer centered on the integers. In figure 9, with σ = 2 this trend
away from the naive expectation has continued. The spacing between the peaks is definitely
greater than unity, and the peaks in the probability distribution have begun to extend beyond
the maximum possible value for the spin, namely 20. Finally, in Figure 10, σ has the value
of 5. This is far too coarse to be able to distinguish individual spins, which have a spacing
of unity. However we notice that the expected value of q is now about 28, 40% higher than
the maximum possible value that the spin is supposed to be able to have. The measurement
of q would give an inferred value of the spin higher than it could possibly be. One might
at this complain that the measuring apparatus is poor, that it does not measure the spin
properly. For almost all normal situations it is ,however, a good measuring apparatus for
the spin. In all normal situations, in which one specified only an initial condition and
not a final condition as well, the outcome would have been exactly what one would have
expected- namely a sum of Gaussian peaks centered around the allowed values of the spin.
It is because one has instituted both initial and final conditions that the measurements
have produced the strange result of a value much higher than the maximum allowed value.
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Pointer measuring the spin with uncertainty 1
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Figure 9
Pointer measuring the spin with uncertainty 2
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Figure 10
Pointer measuring the spin with uncertainty 5
This is a wonderful example of the unusual nature of the effect of the imposition of
conditions in quantum mechanics. The conditions do not reduce simply to initial conditions.
There are no initial conditions whatsoever which could give the results of this gedanken
experiment. It is precisely because of the insufficient-cause nature of quantum theory, that
the temporal order of the conditions is crucial. New knowledge changes the results of the
theory in a way completely unexpected in classical physics.
III. QUANTUM GRAVITY
In this section I will argue that attempts to quantize a theory like General Relativity,
in which time plays the central role, will potentially meet with problems in all four of roles
that time plays in quantum mechanics. I say potentially, because we do not at present have
a quantum theory of gravity. There may be some subtle way in which the difficulties can
be avoided which we do not at present recognize. The ultimate theory of quantum gravity
may be so different from our present notions that the role of time will not even be an issue.
(As an example, quantum mechanics itself was so different from classical theory that issues
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which arose in the latter were not even a question in quantum theory. Furthermore, the
formalism of quantum mechanics itself suggested interpretations which would never have
occurred in classical physics.) Despite the difficulty of discussing a non-existent theory, it
may be worthwhile to look at the difficulties in the hope that a clear view of of them may
suggest a solution to the problems as well. (See also the papers [13] [14].)
I) What is the Hilbert space and what are the operators of the theory? And does one
expect that Hilbert space and the physical operators to be time independent? I will tackle
the second question, and leave the first to the next section. One of the striking predictions
of Einstein’s thoery of gravity was that not only was time intimately involved in gravity but
so was space. In particular one of the first set of solutions to the theory were solutions in
which space became dynamic, and the universe as a whole grew in size. These solutions,
first discovered by Friedman, and hated at first by Einstein, led to what we now know as
the Big Bang theory for the origin of the universe. In the popular imagination, the Big
Bang is like an anarchists bomb, in which at some moment the universe, the cosmic egg,
exploded, and what we now see are the fragments of that explosion hurtling away from us.
As usual, the popular image misses the most radical part of the theory. It is not that there
was some explosion in a preexistent space, but rather that the universe was born very small,
and as time went on, the universe created more space for itself to live in. The reason that
we see the distant galaxies recede from us is not that they are moving away as the remnants
of some inconceivable initial force, but rather that the distance between us and them is
increasing due to the creation of new space between us and them at a more or less constant
rate. Because of this increase in the amount of space, anything in the universe is continually
being diluted. In particular, anything which now has some macroscopic scale, very early on
had a much much smaller scale (a factor of about 1025 on the most naive assumptions, and
a much larger factor difference if inflation actually occurred).
Does this also mean that because there was less space early on there were also fewer
physical attributes that the universe had? My suggestion is yes. Modern physics sees
the fundamental structures which make up the universe as being fields. Fields, like the
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electromagnetic field, are entities that have values at each point in space. The number
of different physical attributes of the world are thus related to the number of different
field values at the different points there could be. At first this would seem to suggest an
infinite number, since there are an uncountably infinite number of points in a classical space.
However, gravity itself would be expected to put a limit on the number of different values
that any field could have. If the field fluctuates at a sufficiently small scale, those fluctuations
would have a sufficient energy to collapse into a black hole. I.e., we would expect gravity
itself to put a limit on the scale of the fluctuations, a limit which very naive estimates would
put at scales of the order of the Plank scale— 10−33 cm or 10−44 sec. For example, one
would expect that field variations on scales smaller that these scales simply would not exist.
If the above is true (and it is very naive, although it gains a slight amount of support by
realizing that the entropy of a black hole is directly related to the number of distinct regions
of Plank size that there are on the horizon of a black hole), then the number of distinct field
values might be finite in any finite volume of space, and that furthermore, the number would
decrease as the universe decreased in size. This would suggest that in the critical assumption
behind condition I) would be wrong, that one should rather describe the universe with a
Hilbert space and a set of operators which could change in time, rather than be a constant.
One of the real difficulties is that no-one knows how to implement a theory where the set of
operators and the Hilbert space change in time. One would also have to face the question
of what the laws would be which would determine such changes. This idea has therefore
received almost no study but remains a disquieting possibility.
II) Dynamics: In the model I presented for the unequable flow of time near the earth, I
used the notion that the structure of the space-time near the earth is essentially constant
throughout time. This allowed me to build up the space-time out of a number of identical
pieces. It was also this notion of a time with respect to which nothing changed that allowed
me to talk about an unequable flow of time. It was the distance notion of time, the time
measured by clocks or other dynamical processes, which ‘flowed unequably’ with respect to
the time, the ‘symmetry time’, with respect to which the space-time was the same from
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time to time. In the generic situation one does not have any symmetry time, any time with
respect to which nothing changes. Rather one must introduce an arbitrary notion of time,
what is called coordinate time, with respect to which one measures change. Although at
first this arbitrariness in the definition of time would seem to make any definite statements
impossible, the techniques of differential geometry, which were developed at the turn of the
century just before Einstein developed his theory by using those techniques, allow one to
identify physical features which are independent of the arbitrariness of the choice of this
coordinate time. However, this arbitrariness has a consequence for the quantum theory.
One of the consequences of the arbitrariness in the choice of coordinate time is that the
natural variables in terms of which one would describe the space-time are themselves partially
redundant. There are too may natural variables, and the theory demands that some of
them obey an equation known as a constraint equation. Such constraints are relations
between the variables at one instant of time rather that relations between the variables at
different instant of time, as in the equations of motion. These constraints are very difficult
to implement quantum mechanically. The most natural technique, introduced by Dirac
to handle any theory with redundant variables, leads to a restriction of the Hilbert space
on which the physical theory is to be defined. This leads as well to a restriction on the
operators. Because of the arbitrariness of time in General Relativity, these constraints on
the natural variables lead to a Hilbert space such that the only natural operators defined on
this space are the constants of the motion. Only those features of the space-time geometry
which do not change from arbitrary time to arbitrary time seem implementable as operators
on the Hilbert space. Thus the dynamical content of the theory seem to be trivial- nothing
changes.
How then do we describe or explain the change that we experience in the world around
us? This is one of the questions that most bedevils any putative theory of quantum gravity.
Although many have thought about the problem, and some have felt that they have solved
it to their own satisfaction, there is no generally accepted answer. Moreover I feel that all
of the suggested answers (including my own) have severe difficulties. How can change be
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described in a theory where the only valid physical quantities that do not change?
III) Probabilities: One of the suggested resolutions of the problem mentioned above
is to select one of the variables of the unconstrained theory is selected as the time. The
physically intuitive reasoning is that time in reality is an unobservable feature of the world
anyway. What actually passes for time is the reading on various and sundry pieces of physical
apparatus called clocks. If you as a child are late for school, it is not because your arrival
at the school is late in relation to any abstract notion of time. It is rather that the reading
on the face of your teacher’s watch is later than the reading at which school was supposed
to start. Note that this approach is in direct contradiction to Newton’s approach as stated
in the quote which began this paper. Time, according to the proponents of this view is
exactly the common view, and Newton’s non-relationist view is wrong. The key problem
with this approach is that it removes the foundation for the third aspect of time in quantum
mechanics. At any one time, any variable has one and only one value. It is this which
physically justifies the whole Hilbert space structure of quantum mechanics. But any real
physical watches are imperfect. It can be proven that any realist watch not only has a finite
probability to stop, it has a finite probability to run backwards. Now as long as the watch
is simply the measure of some outside phenomenon, one could take these probabilities into
account. If, however, time is defined to be the reading on the face of the clock, the question
as to whether or not the clock can stop or run backward is moot— it cannot by definition.
However the other question now raises itself, namely what basis have we for the assertion
that at a time a physical quantity can have one and only one value. At the same readings
on a broken watch, a physical quantity can have an arbitrarily large number of readings.
There is furthermore no reason why the probabilities should add up to unity if the events
are not mutually exclusive. They could add up to far more than unity, and still be in
accord with probability theory if they are independent, mutually exclusive events. What is
the mathematical structure which should be used if time no longer plays this third role of
defining he sets of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities?
IV) We argued in part IV) of the last section that the setting of conditions in quantum
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mechanics was more subtle and rich than in classical theory. In particular, the setting of
conditions is not equivalent to the setting of initial conditions. Furthermore, unless the
experiments were structured so that the conditions always preceded the questions, the usual
use of a state vector to encode the conditions was inapplicable. How does this apply to the
attempts to quantize gravity?
One of the approaches is to regard the constraints as a sort of Schroedinger’s equation,
called the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. The solutions to this equation are then supposed to
correspond to ‘wave functions of the universe’. If we furthermore regard, a la the previous
section, one of the unconstrained variables as the time, the equation is to represent the
probability of measuring various quantities at the ‘time’ denoted by the value of the variable
chosen to play the role of the watch.
In this approach, one of the questions has been: how does one choose which of the
possible solutions to the Wheeler DeWitt equation is supposed to represent the real world?
One of Hawking’s key contributions to the field was to suggest that there was a natural
choice for the ‘wave function for the universe’. He suggested that the ‘initial value’ problem
for the wave function could be solved in a natural way. The technique involves a trick. One
can rewrite the Wheeler DeWitt equation in terms of what is known as a path integral in
which one integrates the exponential of a function of the geometrical configuration called
the action. If instead of using the action in which the time component has the minus sign
in the Pythagorean formula, one instead uses the geometries in which the time component
is treated in all respects like a space component, one can find a natural solution to the
Wheeler DeWitt equation. This solution is obtained by performing the path integral over
all geometries which are completely closed except for a boundary representing the geometry
one is interested in. This approach is described in Hawking’s best seller, A Brief History
of Time.
However in light of the discussion I gave in the section on quantum mechanics, the
problem of setting the conditions in quantum theory is not a problem of initial conditions.
In particular in the case in which the definition of time, of before and after, is problematic,
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one does not expect a wave function to properly encode the setting of conditions. Since the
physical answers differ substantially when the time ordering is changed, the lack of such a
time ordering in the quantum theory of gravity makes this a critical issue. In what order
are the conditions to be set? If a wave function is not the right formalism for describing the
theory, what is the correct formalism?
As should be obvious, the conflicting roles of time in gravity and in quantum theory have
raised a number of difficult issues. Although the field seems no nearer resolution than it did
forty years ago, it does seem that the effort to understand the problems has given us a much
better understanding of the roles played by time in both general relativity and in quantum
theory.
One of the only people to try to come to terms with the above difficulties in the formula-
tion of quantum theory for gravity has been Jim Hartle [15]. In a series of recent papers he
has been applying the consistent histories formalism (briefly sketched in the Appendix A) to
a the problems of Quantum Gravity. His attempts are still in an embryonic stage, but the
formulation is one in which the usual operators on a Hilbert space approach of conventional
quantum mechanics is abandoned. Instead, starting from Feynman’s ‘sum over histories’
approach, he casts quantum gravity directly in terms of histories of observation, histories
which need not be tied to particular instants of time or locations in space. It incorporates
the possibility for the setting of conditions at arbitrary instants and ordering in time. It
might also allow one to speak of situations in which the possible observables can change in
time, as in the concerns above regarding part I . The exact nature of time, of dynamics and
change, has still to be elucidated in my opinion, but it is possible that our present notions
of time can arise from the theory as an approximation. But to go into the details of his
attempts would make this paper much larger than it already is, and I will refer the reader
to his papers instead.
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IV. APPENDIX A
In this appendix, I want to introduce the formalism, developed by Aharonov, Lebowitz
and Bergmann [11], by Griffiths [16], by me [17], and by Gell-Mann and Hartle [18] to
describe quantum mechanics under conditions in which the conditions are set at arbitrary
times and not solely before the time of interest. This formalism is used by all of the above
people in different ways, and Griffiths and Gell-Mann and Hartle have tried to use it to
define a new interpretational scheme for quantum mechanics. I will not go into the details
of that scheme here but refer the reader to the literature. To develop the formalism, we
must introduce some notation. We will again operate in the Heisenberg representation. For
any operator A with discrete eigenvalue a, we can define a Hermitian projection operator
Pa, such that P
2
a = Pa, such that it commutes with A, and such that it obeys APa = aPa.
To use the language of Hartle and Gell-Mann, we now define a ”history” as a sequence of
eigenvalues of various operators at different times, a1, b2, ..., zn where a1 is an eigenvalue of
A at time t1, etc., and t1 > t2 > ... > tn. They define an operator
Ca1b2....zn = Pa1Pb2 ...Pzn
. This operator represents the successive projection onto the eigenstates of the sequence of
operators A1, ..., Zn. Let the ”vector” of eigenvalues
v = (a1 b2 ... zn)
represent a history, so we can write
Ca1b2....zn = Cv
Now define the “decoherence” function
D(v; v˜) = Tr(CvρIC˜v˜)
where v˜ is assumed to be another ‘history’ of possible outcomes of the same sequence of
operators as in v. ρI is the initial density matrix, which I will discuss below. Tr denote
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the trace of the the operator (the sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix). We will
divide the components of v into two categories. The one category is those values which we
know— i.e. those which we wish to use to set the conditions on the questions we ask of the
theory, and the subset which we do not know, i.e., those for which we wish to determine
the probability of that particular outcome. Let me designate the first subset (“known”) by
K(v), and the second by Q(v). Then one finds that
Prob(Q(v)) =
D(v;v)
∑
Q(v)D(v˜; v˜)
where the sum is over all possible v obeying this condition. Notice that we have chosen the
same history in both slots of the decoherence function D in order to define the probabilities.
It is worth pointing out features of this formula. If all of the conditions imposed occur at a
time before any a question, then the above formula simplifies. (I.e., if K(v) all occur before
Q(v), the above may be written as
Prob(Q(v)) = Tr(C(Q)C(K)ρIC † (K)C(Q))/
∑
Q
...
We can thus replace the ρI by a new ρ = C(K)ρIC † (K). Now ρI in the above is supposed
to represent the initial “density matrix” for the system. We note from this paragraph, that
in reality the initial density matrix represents either some theoretical prejudice about the
truly initial state of the system, or represents the cumulative effect of all of those conditions
placed on the system at times earlier than the time in question. We also note that we are free
either to change the initial density matrix in this way once we set more a priori conditions,
or to simply include the extra conditions in the formula as parts of the K terms in the
history. The first option, changing the density matrix, is the process known as ‘reduction of
the wave packet’ in the conventional approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
It is useful at this point to mention that the Decoherence functional has been made the
center of a new interpretation of quantum mechanics. In my presentation above, the results
are all just a minor modification of the standard interpretation of the theory to unusual
situations. However, Griffiths, and Hartle and Gell-Mann have suggested a more radical use
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of this decoherence function, called the consistent histories approach. One of the properties
of this function is that the probability of outcome of some individual measurement depends
on which other measurements are assumed to have been made. I.e., the probabilities of the
various possible outcomes of say the operator B2 in the above depends on whether or not
Zn is included in the history, and on precisely which operator (and thus physical quantity)
Zn represents. This just corresponds to the usual quantum condition that the outcome of
measurements of say the position of a particle depends on whether or not I earlier measured
the momentum of that particle, even if I do not know what the outcome of that earlier
measurement was. In classical physics of course, the measurement of a quantity need not
in and of itself alter the subsequent behaviour of the system. The proposal made by Grif-
fiths, and Gell-Mann and Hartle is that ONLY those histories which have the property of
‘decoherence’ (hence the name ‘decoherence function’) are histories which one can meaning-
fully talk about. All other histories are mathematical fictions of the theory. The property
of decoherence is that a complete set of histories {v} is physically meaningful only if the
decoherence function obeys the property
C(v; v˜) = 0
if v 6= v˜. (Griffiths chooses the weaker requirement that only the real part of C need obey
this condition.) What this condition means is that for this set of histories one does not need
to worry about whether or not some attribute has actually been measured, or included in
the history. The probability of the outcomes of one set of measurements is independent of
whether or not one includes that other measurement in the history. The system behaves
classically in that the measurements do not affect the subsequent behaviour of the system as
indicated by the probabilities of the restricted class of measurements included
in that set of histories.
Let us express this condition formally. Define v′ in relation to v by omitting one of the
elements of the history.
v′ = (a1, ..., ph, sj, ..., zn)
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where
v = (a1, ..., ph, ri, sj, ..., zn)
Assume furthermore that ri is in Q(v), and that we want the probability of some specific
subhistory Q(v′) independent of the value of ri. Now given Prob(Q′, ri), the probability of
Q′ independent of the value of r − i is just
Prob(q′) =
∑
ri Prob(Q
′, ri)
=
∑
ri
Tr(C(v)ρIC(v))∑
Q
Tr(C(v)ρIC(v))
=
∑
ri
∑
(r˜i)
Tr(C(v)ρIC(v˜))∑
Q
Tr(C(v)ρIC(v))
= Tr(C(v
′)ρIC(v˜
′))∑
Q′
Tr(C(v′)ρIC(v′))
where v˜ in the second line is v with the element ri replaced by r˜i. The second line is
valid because by assumption D(v, v˜ = 0 unless v˜ = v. (Although the argument is slightly
less direct in the Griffiths formulation it is still true there as well). The consistent histories
formulation can therefore be phrased as the statement that only those histories are physically
real for which the probabilities are independent of whether or not one of the unknown
elements of the history is present or not.
How do the four roles of time enter into this formalism. The first two are present in
exactly the same way they are in ordinary quantum theory. The third, the exclusivity and
completeness are included by demanding that the sum in C(v) of all of the possible values
for one of the elements of v is the same as the C function excluding that element. I.e., we
have
∑
ri
C(a1, ...qh, ri, sj, ..., zn) = C(a1, ...qh, sj, ..., zn)
And that if say ri and sj are eigenvalues of the same item in the history, at the same time,
(ti = tj), then
C(a1, ...qh, ri, sj , ..., zn) = 0
unless ri = sj . I.e.,, at the same moment in time, the same item in the history cannot have
two different values.
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This decoherence function formalism is clearly designed to implement the fourth condi-
tion. Time enters in a crucial way because the answers obtained depend crucially of the
time ordering of the projection operators in the definition of C. If we reverse the order, or
any pair, the probabilities will not be the same.
It is of interest [19] that one can also generalize the above formula to include the setting
of final conditions in a final density matrix. I.e., we can generalize the formula by including
a ρF as a final condition.
D′ =
Tr(ρFC(vρIC
†(v
(
∑
Q(v) Tr(ρFC(vρIC
†(v)
.
Again ρF will represent either a prejudice about the probabilities of the final state of the
system (e.g., one may want to calculate the probabilities in ones experiment conditional on
the laboratory still existing at the end of the experiment) or the accumulated effect of the
parts of K(v) which occur after all of the times associated with the Q(v).
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